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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a second amended petition for post-conrriction 
relief. Clerk's Record (CR) 95. 
B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts 
Appellant Carlos Esquivel was found guilty following a jury trial of three counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor under age sixteen, I.C. $ 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse of a child 
under age sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506. Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered him to undergo a 
psychosexual evaluation, and the results of that evaluation were included in the presentence 
investigation report (PSI) and considered by the court at sentencing. Carlos was sentenced to 
concurrent unified terms of thirty years, with minimum periods of confinement of fifteen years 
for lewd conduct and a concurrent unified term of fi fteen years with a minimum term of five 
years for sexual abuse. A subsequent Rule 35 motion was denied. And, in a direct appeal, the 
conviction, sentence, and denial ofthe Rule 35 motion were affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 
Esquivel v. State, Docket No. 32689 (Ct. App. August 3,2007) Slip Op. p. 1-2.' 
Carlos then filed apro  se petition for post-conviction relief alleging several claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and seeking appointment of counsel in post- 
conviction. The district court denied the motion for appointment of counsel, and Carlos filed all 
amended application, and again asked for counsel. Again, the district court denied counsel and 
ultimately dismissed the petition. Icl. p. 2. 
' This Court has taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript 
filed in the prior appeal No. 32689. CR 3. 
Carlos appealed, coc~nsel was appointed, and the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished 
opinion on August 3,2008. Tile Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings. In particular, the Court held that the district couli did not ell in denying 
coc~~~sel  in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel's hilure to request 
that Carlos undergo a polygraph examination. However, the district court did err in denying 
counsel in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the alleged failures of 
counsel in relation to the psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, the case was remanded for 
appointment of counsel to assist in pursing this single potentially valid claim. Id. p. 7-8 
The Courl of Appeals wrote: 
Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment of 
counsel to assist him in his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly challenge the psychosexual evaluation used 
against him after Esquivcl requested trial counsel to do so. A lssychosexual 
evaluation conducted for sentencing purposes is considered a critical stage of the 
defendant's case. Estracla v. State, 143 Idaho 558,562, 149 P.3d 833,837 (2006). 
Therefore, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel's advice regarding 
his or her parlicipation in an evaluation. Icl. at 558-59, 149 P.3d at 837-38. Trial 
coul~sel's failure to properly advise a defendant regarding his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights in submitting to a psychosexual evaluation may amount to 
deficient ~erfonnance. See id. at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. When there is a 
reasonable probability that the sentence would be different had the psychosexual 
evaluation not been included, or had been more favorable to the defendant, a trial 
counsel's deficient performance may also he prejudicial. See [State v.] Wood, 132 
Idaho [88,] 101,967 P.2d [702,] 715, Estrada, 143 Idaho at 5G5, 149 P.3d at 840. 
Esquivel's application alleges facts indicating the possibility that his court-ordered 
psychosexual evaluation was inadequately conducted and that he voiced his 
concerns about the evaluation to his trial counsel. Esquivcl's application, in 
essence, claims his trial coul~sel was deficient for failing to either question the 
collduct of the expert who perfomled the evaluation or request that a different 
expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. The record before this Court on 
appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation 
were considered by'the district court in making its sentencing decision and 
was a factor contributing to the length of his sentence. 
Esquivel v. State, Slip Op. at p. 6-7 (emphasis added) 
The record before the Court of Appeals which supported its finding that the district conrt 
considered the psychosexual evaluation in making its sentencing decision was set out in Carlos' 
Opening Brief, Carlos wrote there: 
. . . Prejudice in this case is clear because the psychosexual report was heavily 
relied upon by the State in recommending a lengthy prison sentence and by the 
District Court in determining the sentence and i11 denying the Rule 35 motion. 
At sentencing, the State argued that the evaluation showed Mr. Esquivel needed to 
be punished severely. It stated: 
[H]e continues to pose a more significant risk. He went to SANE 
and was evaluated, although he was not particularly forthcoming in 
the SANE evaluation. He refused to answer the MSI questions 
because he said he just didn't like the questions and thought that 
they were just, in his words, sick or perverted or something along 
those lines. He wouldn't appropriately answer the Millon and so 
that test couldn't be scored. Unfortunately the examination doesn't 
give the evaluation - doesn't give the Court as much information 
as you might have liked, but that is the defendant's doing and be 
chose not to be cooperative with that. It is interesting to note that 
Dr. Engle . . . immediately detects that [Mr. Esquivel] has an 
attitude of arrogance and an attitude that conveys clearly that he is 
a victim ofthe instant offense, the criminal justice system, and the 
evaluation process and that's reflected in Dr. Engle's evaluation of 
the defendant. 
So looking at the risk, Judge, I think when Dr. Engle says he's at 
least a medium risk to reoffend, that's in the best light givcn that 
the defendant doesn't finish out on testing in this case. He's in 
total denial of what happened. . . . 
Given all that, Your Honor, the State in evaluating this case knows 
that this is a situation that calls out for a prison sentence. There are 
issues which involve punishment and retribution. There are 
concerns that the defendant is not a rehabilitation candidate at this 
time because he is in total denial[.] 
T (30424) pg. 256, in. 21- pg. 258, In. 18 
The Court imposed the precise sentence recommended by the state and in doing so 
relied upon Dr. Engle's report. 
So when I look at all these facts and I look at the fact that Mr. 
Esquivel was really not cooperative in that evaluation and I realize 
that there's an argument to be made that a person does this if they 
are innocent of the charge, but I was concerned when I saw that he 
didn't complete the part of the test and I don't buy the whole idea 
that he was uncomfortable with answering questions abo~tt his own 
sexual interests. He was aware that this was an important 
evaluation that the Court was going to take into consideration in 
deciding what to do. I'm concerned again with the guarded nature 
in which he answered some of the questions by the evaluator. True 
it is that - it's not to be unexpected that an individual will get an 
evaluation of a moderate level of risk because of denial, hut the 
fact of the matter that the Court cannot ignore the fact that he was 
evaluated as having a moderate level of risk. Although today he's 
indicated that he's interested in having and attending the 
appropriate therapy, I want to note that it's easy to come into this 
Court and make those kinds of assertions, but all along in his 
comments to the evaluator he made it clear that he was not 
interested in having any sort of treatment. 
T (30424) pg. 270, in. 2-22 
Along these same lines, the Court relied upon Dr. Engle's evaluation in denying 
Mr. Esquivel's Rule 35 motion. It stated: 
The S.A.N.E. evaluation stated Esquivel was a moderate risk to re- 
offend and the evaluator opined he was not amenable to treatment 
because in part he denied an offense occurred and was uninterested 
and unwilling to participate in sex offender treatment. 
CR (30424) 121; Memorandum Decision (denying Rule 35 Motion), pg. 4. 
Esquivel v. State, Docket No. 32689, Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 21-22 
On remand, the district court appointed counsel, who filed an amended post-conviction 
petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. ~pecif idal i~,  the petition alleged that counsel 
rendered deficient performance in failing to properly advise Carlos regarding his Fifth 
Amendment rights in submitting to a psychosexual evaluation. CR 25. 
In response, the state filed a motion to dismiss supported by the affidavit of Carlos' trial 
counsel. In that affidavit, counsel stated that he "did not tell my client that he had a fifth 
ameiidinent right not to participate in that psychosexual evaluation." CR 44. 
Based upon this affidavit, no evidentiary hearing was held. However, briefing was 
submitted by both pasties. CR 87. 
Ultimately, the district court dismissed Carlos' petition. In its opinion, the district court 
found that Carlos had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney's advice, or 
lack thereof, in regard to the psychosexual evaluation was deficient. ". . . Esquivel has proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence that his attorney's advice, or lack of advice, was deficient." CR 
88. 
However, the district court then went on to find, contrary to the previous holding of the 
Court of Appeals, that it had not considered the psychosexual report in fashioning its sentence 
and therefore there was no prejudice. The district court wrote: 
While the Court of Appeals suggests in its decision that the mention of the 
psychosexual evaluation implied that the Court relied on the report, that is not the 
case. This Court determined Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave 
and the evidence produced at trial and not on the psychosexual evaluation. The 
psychosexual evaluation did not increase or reduce his sentence. Esquivel did not 
receive a different sentence, either enhanced %reduced, based on his reiitsal to 
cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of its contents. It was his 
failure to accevt resvonsibility that demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely. 
CR 92 (underscore original). 
Finding no connection between the psychosexual evaluation and Carlos' sentence, the 
district court held that Carlos had failed to meet the prejudice prong of Stvickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1 984), and dismissed his petition. CR 81. 
This appeal timely followed. CR 95. 
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the law of the case doctrine prohibit the district court from deciding in direct 
opposition to the Court of Appeals' holding that counsel's deficient performance was not 
prejudicial? 
2. In the first alternative, given the record, did the district court e n  in determining that 
counsel's deficient perfonna~~ce was not prejudicial? 
3. In the second alternative, should this case have been analyzed, not as an ineffective 
assistance of counsel case, but rather as a case involving a denial of the state and federal 
constitutional rights against compelled testimony, and under such analysis, is reversal required 
because the state cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that denying Carlos his constitutional 
right to remain silent was harmless error? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Law of the Case Doctrine Prohibits the District Court from Finding in 
Opposition to the Court of Appeals a Failure to Demonstrate Prejudice. 
In dismissing Carlos' petition, the district court found that counsel had rendered deficient 
performance, but that the deficient performance was not prejudicial because the psychosexual 
evaluation did not affect the length of Carlos' sentence. However, this holding is directly 
contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals in the appeal of the dismissal of Carlos' initial 
petition and is prohibited by the law of the case doctrine. Therefore, the order dismissing Carlos' 
amended petition must now be reversed 
When the Couit of Appeals determined that the district court had erred in denying 
couilsel to assist Carlos in presenting the issue of whether he had been denied effective assistance 
of counsel in relation to cou~isel's actions/inactions regarding the psychosexual evaluation, the 
Court had to determine whether the post-conviction petition had alleged facts that might give rise 
to a valid claim. Esquivel v. State, Slip Op. at page 7, citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
792-93, 102 P.3d 1108, 11 11-12 (2004). In malting that determination, the Court of Appeals was 
required to consider both whether Carlos had alleged facts pointing to deficient performance and 
whether he had alleged facts pointing to prejudice. Esquivel v. State, Slip Op. at pages 6-7 
In determining whether there were facts alleged to point to prejudice, the Court of 
Appeals wrote: 
The record before this Court on Appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's 
psychosexual evaluatio~l were considered by the district court in malting its 
sentencing decisioil and was a factor contributing to the length of his sentence. 
Esquivel v. State, Slip Op. at page 7 
However, on remand, the district court held to the contrary, stating that it did not rely 
upon the psychosexual report in deciding what sentence to impose. CR 92. 
This holding by the district court violates the law of the case doctrine. 
"The 'law of the case' doctrine provides that when 'the Supreme Court, in deciding a case 
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
proiloullcemeilt becomes the law of the case and must be adliered to throughout its subsequei~t 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." Taylor v. Maile, - Idaho -, 
- P.3d -, 2009 WL 213074 * 3 (2009), citing Suitts v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 110 
Idaho 15,21,713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985), quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop., Inc., 180 
Mont. 343, 345, 591 P.2d 196, 197 (1979). 
Further, the law of the case doctrine applies to all appellate decisions, not just those of the 
Supreme Court. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,515,5 P.3d 973,976 (2000). "[A] 
decision by the appellate court upon a point distinctly made and essential to its determination 
upon a previous appeal is in all subsequent proceedings, in the same case, a final adjudication." 
Brinton v. Johnson, 41 Idaho 583,592,240 P. 859,861 (1925). 
Moreover, the law of the case doctrine applies to mixed questions of law and fact as well 
as questions of law. See, Airsti*earn, Inc. v. CITFinancial Services, Inc., 115 Idaho 569, 574- 
575,768 P.2d 1302, 1307-1308 (1988) (applying the law of the case doctrine to the question of 
whether CIT was purchasing recreational vehicles from Airstream); and Insurance Associates 
Covp. v. Harzsen, 116 Idaho 948,950-51,782 P.2d 1230, 1232-33 (1989) (applying the law of the 
case doctrine to a trial court's original findings of fact which were upheld by the Court of 
Appeals). "Accordingly, the facts having been decided, they are final, they have become the law 
of the case, and the Court oCAppeals' pronouncement must be adhered to, both in the trial court 
and on subsequent appeal." Id. And, the question of whether prejudice has been established in a 
post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54, 764 P.2d 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals held that the record established that the psychosexual 
evaluation did affect the length of the sentence imposed. Therefore, the district court could not 
revisit that question on remand and find no prejudice relative to counsel's deficient perfomlance 
in not advising Carlos of his constitutioilal rights relative to the evaluation. Taylor v. Maile, 
supra; Swanson v. Swanson, supra; Insurance Associates Coup, v. Hansen, supra; Young v. 
State, supva. 
Having found deficient performance and by the doctrine of the law of the case being 
required to find prejudice, the district court erred in dismissing Carlos' petition. Strickland v. 
Washington, supra. 
B. In the First Alternative. the District Court's Findine that it did no; Rely upon 
the Psvcl~osexual Evaluation in Sentencing Carlos is Clearly Erroneous. 
As set out above, the law of the case doctrine requires that the district court decision 
dismissing Carlos' petition must be reversed. However, the district court decision must also be 
reversed because it is clearly erroneous. 
On review of the dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court will not 
disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Queen 
v. State, 146 Idaho 502, 503, 198 P.3d 731,732 (Ct. App. 2008). The appellate court exercises 
free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Queen v. State, 146 
Idaho at 504, 198 P.3d at 733. 
In this case, the district coud found that it did not consider the psychosexual evaluation in 
determining Carlos's sentence. However, because this finding was clearly erroneous, it must 
now be reversed. I.R.C.P. 52(a), Queen v. State, supra. 
As set out in Carlos' Opening Brief in his initial appeal and as quoted above, both the 
state and the district court relied on the psychosexual evaluation in recommei~ding and imposing 
a sentence. The state spoke of how Carlos had gone to SANE, but refbsed to answer MSI 
questions and co~nplete the Millon, and how Dr. Engle found Carlos to be arrogant and at least a 
medium risk to re-offend. T (30424) pg. 256, in. 21 - pg. 258, in. 18. And, the district court, 
imposing the precise sentence the state requested, based upon the psychosexual evaluation, also 
cited the evaluatioll as supportive of the sentence. T (30424) pg. 270, in. 2-22. And, then in 
denying Carlos' Rule 35 motion, the district court again stated its reliance on the psycl~osexual 
evaluatioi~. CR (30424) 121; Memorandum Decision (denying Rule 35 Motion), pg. 4. 
Although the district court now states that it did not rely on the psychosexual report, but 
rather only mentioned the report in passing, that finding is contrary to the record. Because the 
finding was clearly erroneous, it must now be reversed. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Queen v. State, supva. 
And, when the finding that the district court did not rely on the evaluation in sentencing and in 
denying the Rule 35 motion is reversed, the order denying post-conviction relief must also be 
reversed. Strickland v. Washington, supva. 
C. In the Second Alternative, Reversal is Required Because the State Did Not and 
Ca11not Demonstrate Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Error in Denving Carlos 
his State and Federal Collstitulional Rights to Remain Silent was Harmless. 
The denial of Carlos' petition must be reversed first because it violates the law of the case 
doctrine and second because it rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding by the district court. 
But, the denial must also be reversed because, in accord with DeRushe' v. State, - Idaho -, 
200 P.3d 1148 (2009), the error in denying Carlos his right to remain silent must be analyzed 
under the constitutional error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 82 S. Ct. 824, 
veh 'g denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 1283 (1967), a standard the state did not and cannot meet. 
In DeRushi, the petitioner filed apvo se petilion alleging that trial counsel had committed 
an error in depriving him of the right to testify in his own behalf. Analyzing this claim as an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district coull rejected it, stating, "There is nothing that 
is in front of the court or in the record that [DeRushk's counsel's] decision not to put Mr. 
DeRushi: on breached that standard or breached the duty of counsel." DeRushd v. State, - 
Idaho at -, 200 P.3d at 11 52 
The Supreme Court held that the district COLII? erred in malcing this analysis: 
The district court erred in analyzing DeKushk's claim as alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel rather than as alleging denial of his constitutiol~al right to 
testify in his own behalf. 
The difference between an analysis under the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and an analysis under the doctrine of the denial of the right to testify is explained in State v 
Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1985): 
. . . if the failure of a defelldant to testify is considered only in the context of 
deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, and not in the context of 
effective assistance of counsel, then the defendant has the burden only to show he 
was deprived of the right to testify. The burden then shifts to the state to 
demonstrate that the constitutional violation was harlnless ei-ror, i.e., the state 
must convince the reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged 
error did not contribute to the defendant's convictioll. Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 1181 at 24, 82 S. Ct. [824] at 828 [rehgdeniecl, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 
1283 (1967)l. 
State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 927 
In accord with DeRushd, the denial of a defendant's right to testify should be analyzed, 
not as an instance of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, but rather as a 
denial of a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. And, in that analysis, the burden is 
on the state to demonstrate that the error was ha~mless error. In other words, the state must 
convince the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that denying a defendant of the right to 
testify did not contribute to histher conviction and sentence. Chapman v. California, supra; State 
v. Darbin, supra. 
The denial of the right to testify, as at issue in DeRushe', is analogous to the constitutioilal 
right to remain silent. U.S. Const. Amend. 5, Idaho Const. Art. I, 5 13. Just as tlie denial of the 
right to testify must be analyzed under the Chapman hamiless error standard, so also must the 
denial of the right to remain silent be analyzed under the Chapman liannless error standard. See, 
DeRushe' v. State, supra. In this case, that means that to avoid the grant of relief on post- 
conviction, the state must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the psychosexual 
evaluation did not contribute to Carlos's sentence. 
This is a burden the state did not and cannot cany. As set out above, the record is clear 
and the Court of Appeals has held that the psychosexual evaluation was relied upon by the 
district court in fashioning its sentence. That being the case, the error in denying Carlos his right 
to remain silent with regard to the evaluation cannot be found to be hannless error. 
Because the state cannot demonstrate liannless error, the order denying post-conviction 
relief must be reversed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The order denying post-conviction relief must be reversed for three reasons: 1) because 
the district court's findingthat it did not rely upon the psychosexual evaluation in sentencing or 
denying Rule 35 relief, and thus there was no prejudice for purposes of demonstrating ineffective 
assistance of counsel, violated the law of the case doctrine; 2) because the district court's finding 
that it did not rely upon the psychosexual evaluation in sentencing or denying Rule 35 relief, and 
thus there was no prejudice for purposes of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel, was 
clearly erroneous; and 3) because the denial of the constitutional right to remain silent should 
have been analyzed under the Chapman standard of harmless error, a standard the state did not 
and cannot meet. 
For these reasons, Carlos asks that this Court reverse the order denying post-conviction 
relief and remalid for further proceedings 





Attonieys for Appellant Carlos Esquivel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE * 
I hereby certify that on t h i s x  day of March, 2009, I deposited in the United States mail, 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid addressed to: 
Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Dennis Benjamin 1 
